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Program in Mozambique: 




 The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) was invited by the 
Minister of Defense to develop and implement programs to assist 
Mozambique consolidate democratic civil-military relations.  The first 
program was held at the CCMR in Monterey, California, in March 1998 for 
the Minister and four other top officials, and was followed by a program 
in Maputo, Mozambique in March of 1999 for fifty-six officers and 
civilians.  The CCMR programs fit centrally into the Government of 
Mozambique’s overall strategy to develop new structures and processes to 
solidify domestic stability and democratic governance. 
The tremendous scope of this challenge, and the central importance 
of civil-military relations, can be readily appreciated by the brief review 
below of Mozambique’s troubled history since the armed independence 
movement emerged in 1962 and continuing since independence on 25 
June 1975.  During the past forty years Mozambique has been caught up in 
the dramatic political changes which have swept Southern Africa which 
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include the tremendous changes in Rhodesia, to become Zimbabwe, and 
the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa.  The events include a 
decade of guerrilla warfare, achievement of independence, controversial 
initial decisions to transform the society, civil war, regional conflict, 
economic dislocation and widespread misery, and finally peace in 1992 
followed by democratic elections two years later.  The Cold War was also 
part of the story.  Today, at the end of the Century, the prospects for 
peace, stability, and development are better than at any time since 
independence.  Nevertheless, the country’s challenges are daunting.  
Currently Mozambique is the poorest country in Africa, if not the world, 
with a 1996 GDP per capita of $90.  Mozambique’s strategic position as a 
maritime outlet on the Indian Ocean for its neighbors including South 
Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia, its 
potential as a source of electrical energy, and its diplomatic influence in 
the Great Lakes Region and in Angola make the question of Mozambican 
stability and development a vital one for the entire region. 
 
Background 
 The centrality of civil-military relations is obvious if we recall that 
Mozambique experienced only three years of peace between the 
  4
emergence of the armed independence movement in 1962 and the first 
democratic elections in 1994.  War devastated the countryside, especially 
the Northern provinces.  Independence from Portugal was hard fought, 
and by 1975 the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), had 
approximately 11,000 armed fighters within Mozambique alone as well as 
more in neighboring countries.  Independence ultimately came with the 
sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime in Portugal on 25 April 1974.  
The withdrawal of Portuguese forces from Mozambique, combined with 
the policies of a Frelimo government hostile to the settler population, led 
to the rapid departure of 90% of the 120,000 Portuguese residing in 
Mozambique at that time.  This was critically important, as Portugal had 
not prepared Mozambique (nor Angola, Guinea-Bissau, or Timor) for 
independence.  At independence there were only 40 Mozambican 
university graduates and 30 trained doctors.   
 Frelimo was aggressive and dogmatic in establishing a one party 
Socialist state along Marxist-Leninist lines.  Within a short time, at least in 
terms of formal treaties, Mozambique became the Third World state most 
closely linked with the Soviet bloc.  Frelimo imposed extensive social and 
economic transformations and permitted no political opposition.  These 
heavy-handed methods of social and economic transformation alienated 
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large sectors of Mozambican society, and, in the radically changing 
context of Southern Africa, the severely challenged white dominated 
regimes of Rhodesia, until it became Zimbabwe, and then South Africa, 
supported the founding and supplying of an armed opposition to Frelimo, 
the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo).  Renamo was founded by 
dissidents from Frelimo, with the initiative taken by the Rhodesian 
intelligence service.  Between 1976 and 1992 civil war raged across most of 
Mozambique resulting in devastation of the country’s infrastructure, 
elimination of villages, widespread killing, and the uprooting of some 4 
million people, with another 1.7 million fleeing to neighboring countries.  
The war combined with a severe drought in the early 1990’s plunged 
Mozambique ever deeper into chaos and disorder.  
 Mozambique’s cycle of misery and death was broken by the 
implosion of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the 
dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa with its subsequent 
democratization.  Within Mozambique both the Frelimo government and 
Renamo armed opposition were exhausted, and deprived by changes in 
the international system of outside support.  Already in 1989 the 
government began to de-emphasize Marxism - Leninism and allow more 
autonomy to the society and economy.  Despite the favorable external 
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conditions and increasing internal willingness for peace, it required very 
active external mediation, including the Community of San Egidio and 
several states to achieve a negotiated peace.  Negotiations began in 1990 
and resulted in a General Peace Agreement in October 1992.  This 
agreement opened the way to the UN Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) which from 1992 until elections in 1994 supervised the cease-
fire that led to the free and internationally monitored elections in October 
of that year.  Unlike the failure in Angola, elections were held only after 
demobilization.  ONUMOZ also assisted greatly in peace-building and in 
providing humanitarian assistance.  ONUMOZ had 1,100 civilian police 
and 4,000 armed troops, and was joined by numerous NGOs.  In short, the 
international community greatly assisted Mozambique’s transition to 
peace and democracy. 
 The internationally mediated peace and the subsequent elections 
opened the way for Mozambican development.  The legacy of the past is, 
however, terrible.  The country is miserably poor and the current foreign 
debt is double the per capita income.  The country has no tradition of 
democratic cooperation, and the main political forces emerging from the 
1994 elections, Frelimo and Renamo, remained heavily militarized 
organizations.  Frelimo grew out of a guerrilla movement and Renamo 
  7
was nothing but an army until 1994.  As part of the General Peace 
Agreement of October 1992, the armed forces of both groups were to be 
demobilized.  The demobilized included 58,000 from Frelimo and 20,000 
from Renamo.  The initial plan was to have a combined armed forces, the 
Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique (FADM), of 30,000 men 
equally divided between Frelimo and Renamo.  However, with the option 
to demobilize only 12,000 opted to join the FADM as the conditions of the 
soldiers had been terrible and the demobilization package looked 
attractive in comparison.  This is a serious problem due to the 
disequilibrium in the forces (8,000 from Frelimo and 4,000 from Renamo).  
In addition, these forces are too small for the legitimate needs of 
Mozambique’s national security.  The now combined forces had known 
only war against each other and now they are together in the FADM.  
While continually engaged in conflict, these were not very professional 
forces but rather generally poorly trained and proficient at only a low 
level of warfare.  Also, while many of the government officers had 
received training abroad, very few of the Renamo forces had received any 
foreign training at all.  As summarized by an expert in 1996 after a long 
list of problems, “What matters now is to acknowledge such deficiencies 
and undertake the necessary additional training and orientation in order 
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to raise the general level of technical expertise and promote an 
organizational culture in line with the new political system.” 1 
 Mozambique’s political leaders are making a valiant attempt to 
learn from their past mistakes as well as from the mistakes of others to 
ensure lasting peace and democracy.  This desire for a new political 
situation was already apparent in 1990 when the constitution was revised 
to replace the old Marxism-Leninist philosophy with a Western 
conception of democracy.  With the peace process and the elections, this 
process of political innovation has been extended to the area of civil-
military relations.  Between 1995 and 1998 the government, with the 
approval of the multi-party Assembly of the Republic, passed three 
fundamental laws to build the institutional basis for democratic civilian-
control and professional armed forces.  These are the National Defense 
Bill, the Military Code of Conduct, and the Military Service Law.  These 
three laws involved extensive debate in the Assembly between especially 
Frelimo and Renamo and in Mozambique society at large.  The debate on 
the Military Service Law, which implements conscription, was especially 
heated. Frelimo favors conscription both to build up the force and to use 
the FADM in building a national awareness.  Building on this legal 
                                                 
1 Joao Bernardo Honwana, The United Nations and Mozambique A Sustainable Peace? 
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foundation, the year 1998 was to begin the basic redefinition and 
revamping of the armed forces.  The CCMR programs are designed to 
encourage and inform this process.  
 
Origins of the CCMR Program in Mozambique 
 The link between the perceived needs of Mozambique in redefining 
and revamping the armed forces and the CCMR occurred in August 1997 
when the Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, 
with responsibility for Africa, General James Jamerson, visited Maputo 
and met with Minister of Defense, Aguiar Mazula.  Minister Mazula is the 
first civilian Minister of Defense in Mozambique, had previously been the 
Minister of Labor, and comes from a family of highly educated 
Mozambicans.  His brother, Brazao Mazula, was head of the National 
Electoral Commission, which interpreted the laws governing the 1994 
elections and is at present the rector of Eduardo Mondlane University.  
Aguiar Mazula as Minister of Defense clearly sees it as his mission to 
establish democratic civil-military relations.  
 Minister Mazula and General Jamerson discussed how the U.S. 
could be helpful in redefining and revamping the armed forces and civil-
                                                                                                                                     
(Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, 1996), p. 32. 
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military relations in general.  The immediate result was an invitation to 
Minister Mazula for a Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT) to 
the United States in March of 1998.  The program was funded from the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 
administered by the Defense Attaché in Maputo.  While there were several 
important protocol events and meetings in Washington, D.C. and 
subsequent community involvement opportunities, the main purpose of 
the DVOT was to acquaint the Mozambicans with the programs offered 
by CCMR in Monterey during the week of 16-21 March. Accompanying 
Minister Mazula were two members of the Assembly and the Chief of 
Staff of the Navy and Vice Chief of the Army.  Two were from Frelimo 
and two from Renamo.  During the week the CCMR put on a full program 
of seminars involving fifteen faculty members to include retired high-
ranking officers and a retired member of Congress as well as a prominent 
member of Congressional staff.  In addition, Mr. Sam Farr, the member of 
Congress from Monterey, spoke to the visiting delegation on the role of 
congress in controlling the armed forces in democracies.  The 
Mozambicans also visited classes and met with students from Africa as 
well as U.S. officers studying to become regional experts on Africa.  
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Minister Mazula and the CCMR agreed on the topics that would be 
covered in a program to be held in Mozambique by early the next year.   
 
The Program in Maputo 
 The seminar was held in Maputo, Mozambique, the week of 15-19 
March 1999.  It was also funded from IMET administered by the Defense 
Attaché in Maputo.  Given the priorities of the Minister, the participants in 
this first program on civil-military relations in Mozambique were heavily 
FADM officers (41), including several general officers, and 15 civilians 
including members of the Assembly from Frelimo and Renamo (the two 
parties holding all but 9 seats in the 250 member Assembly), governors, 
officials in the Ministry of Defense, and academics.  The group included 
most of “those who matter” in defense policy in Mozambique.  It became 
obvious very quickly that the participants, and particularly the officers, 
have very diverse educational and training background.  Some had 
extensive training abroad, in a variety of countries (USSR, China, Cuba, 
Germany, South Africa, Portugal) while others apparently had none.  
Consequently, one of the main purposes of the seminar was to facilitate 
and focus a discussion among officers and between them and civilians on 
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key issues in civil-military relations.  In short, the seminar’s purpose was 
to initiate a dialogue on a common set of themes. 
 The team of CCMR instructors selected especially for the program 
in Mozambique consisted of four senior instructors:  an academic who 
specializes in comparative civil-military relations, researches on Portugal 
and its ex-colonies, and speaks Portuguese; a retired four star admiral 
with extensive experience in political/military affairs at the Pentagon and 
in Europe; an Austrian Army colonel with a doctoral degree in philosophy 
who specializes in armed forces and society; and another academic who 
specializes in military history, has written on colonialism in Africa, and 
has published eight major books on civil-military relations including one 
on the Portuguese revolution.  The credentials of the team were not lost on 
the participants who made clear their interest in learning the maximum 
from the team’s academic and practical knowledge.  The experience in 
Mozambique supports what CCMR has found again and again; the team 
of instructors must be of a sufficiently high level in academic and practical 
experience to command initial credibility with the participants.  Once this 
is achieved, their attention is focused, they become engaged, and there is 
dialogue and debate. 
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 The team was selected for their seniority and to match expertise 
with the topics requested by Minister Mazula during the DVOT.  There 
were twelve major topics, each one beginning with a 45-minute 
presentation and finishing with a one-hour discussion period.  The 
emphasis was on issues such as the armed forces, society, and politics; the 
military as a profession; the officer promotion process; roles and missions 
of the armed forces during peacetime; the responsibilities of officers and 
civilians in formulating strategy; the military and the media; conscription 
vs. the all volunteer force; and the process of resource allocation.  Not 
surprisingly, most of the discussion by the participants focused on those 
issues closest to their corporate interests such as conscription (which has 
been implemented in Mozambique), roles and missions in peacetime, the 
officer promotion process, the media, and resource allocation. 
 The challenge for the instructors in Mozambique as elsewhere is to 
make their presentations general enough to be relevant to many cases, 
which are all to some degree unique, and illustrate with real life examples.  
These examples should be drawn from the experiences of several 
countries so that the participants are not left with the impression that the 
U.S. offers the best, or only, model to follow.  It is thus extremely 
important to work out in advance the “logic” of the overall program, the 
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integration of the dozen issues into the program, as well as the contents of 
the specific topics, illustrated with relevant examples.  The presentations, 
informed by research on the country and knowledge of the issues, take on 
a life of their own as the participants seek to make them as relevant as 
possible to their real concerns.  For this reason the instructors must be 
actual subject matter experts, with practical and hopefully theoretical 
knowledge, to be able to respond and assist in making the subject matter 
fully useful.  The team must be familiar with the issues of concern to the 
civilians and officers through background research and ongoing 
conversations with the participants.  
 In its programs CCMR uses simulations which are tailored to the 
specific context of the country.  Thus while the case study is of an 
imaginary country - in this case Demosland - the participants can turn it 
into their country since the description of the civil-military problems and 
development challenges are similar.  In Maputo, the simulation was 
spread over three afternoons and included the nature of the military as 
profession, threats to the country and requirements for strategy to 
respond to these threats, and the assigning of budgetary priorities to 
security and other government functions.  The group was divided into 
four smaller groups combining military, from the different services, with 
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civilians to work on the problem.  At the end of each afternoon, the 
spokesman, which rotated daily, presented the group’s findings to the 
others and responded to questions.  The simulation worked extremely 
well, with lively and dynamic debate and readily comprehensible and 
logical conclusions.   
 In the discussion and debate on most of the topics, and certainly in 
the simulation, the major concerns of the armed forces were obvious.  The 
officers are apprehensive regarding the future.  After all, the country has 
been at war during most of its recent history, and thus the military, 
professional or otherwise, has been central to society and politics.  With 
peace, the officers question their futures and the FADM.  What will be the 
FADM’s roles and missions in peacetime?  With demobilization, the forces 
did not incorporate the agreed upon and anticipated 30,000 personnel, but 
something closer to 12,000 troops which are clearly insufficient for internal 
and external roles in a country the size of Mozambique.  Largely for this 
reason they resorted to conscription.  The country has now had 
democratic elections, and will have elections again in October of 1999, and 
for the first time has a civilian minister of defense.  Peace was initiated 
through international mediation and ONUMOZ played a central role in its 
consolidation.  But the country is heavily indebted with much influence of 
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external donors including states and international organizations.  Foreign 
involvement and links have been extremely important in Mozambique’s 
recent history, but are not viewed in one prism.  Rather, there is a 
tremendous concern for “globalization” which seems to connote external 
control over Mozambique.  This theme came up again and again; how 
Mozambique is powerless over its destiny.  While this theme related 
mainly to economics and technology, it also emerged in defense.  After all, 
Southern Africa has for a long while been a “dangerous neighborhood”, 
and with small and poorly equipped forces Mozambique feels somewhat 
vulnerable.  The instructors gave some insights into how other countries 
have dealt with their weaknesses in the international system; internal 
unity and a plan is crucial, combined with external supporters.  What the 
CCMR team provides are concepts, examples, and insights whereby the 
Mozambicans can better deal with the challenges that confront them and 
see how others have dealt with similar challenges.  The participants 
seemed to welcome and appreciate this form of foreign involvement. 
 
Measures of Success 
 From all indications the seminar was a success.  How can one know 
and how can success be defined?  These considerations are especially 
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important as the CCMR programs are education, and thus by nature long-
term.  Also, they are but one small part of the overall structure and 
processes; they hopefully support a positive direction in these other 
elements.  The CCMR routinely administers an anonymous end-of-course 
questionnaire including ten items to solicit the comments and criticisms of 
the participants.  What is striking about the results from Mozambique is 
how comprehensive and thoughtful, as well as positive, the comments are.  
The evaluation of the team is very high - 9.5 on a 10 point scale, they think 
the themes covered are all directly relevant to Mozambique, the 
simulation is very highly rated, and they make suggestions for other 
topics to be covered in a future seminar.  Several of the questionnaires 
highlighted the dynamic in which the instructors debate among 
themselves and engage the participants for their experiences and insights.  
This type of interaction, which is sought in all CCMR programs, is often a 
unique experience for the participants.  For CCMR the goal is to serve as a 
catalyst for civil-military interaction, stimulate thought on key issues, and 
promote a dialogue.  Thus these anonymous written records are one 
indicator of success. 
 The CCMR also seeks to gauge the receptivity of the program and 
the topics as the program progresses and at the conclusion in 
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conversations at the coffee breaks, lunch, and other social opportunities.  
While only one of the instructors spoke Portuguese, several of the 
participants spoke some English, French, or German and could thus 
communicate with the instructors without requiring the interpreters, who 
were available in any case.  In this way team members adjust the content 
and “pitch” as the program progresses for maximum effect.  By the end 
the participants were stating to the team members that the seminar was a 
“watershed” and they were already using some of the concepts and 
insights in their work in the Assembly, FADM, and the police.  Several 
officers stated that they had never thought about civilian control in 
positive terms, and even more noted that this was the first time that 
officers and civilians had discussed the crucial and often difficult issues.  
In sum, the informal feedback was very positive. 
 The coverage in the media was good throughout the week. Several 
of the print media covered the seminar frequently and radio and 
television media visited at the beginning, middle, and end.  The team 
leader was interviewed in Portuguese, and summaries of several of the 
lectures were published in the newspapers.  The value of the coverage was 
to disseminate some of the topics, and the general idea of democratic civil-
military relations, more widely in society. 
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Future Plans 
 There are two follow-on actions being discussed with the Minister 
of Defense and the FADM.  One is to send a civilian from the Ministry of 
Defense or a junior officer to the masters degree program in International 
Security and Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Several possible candidates were interviewed and it is up to the Ministry, 
in cooperation with the U.S. embassy, to nominate the student.  The 
graduate would return both to teach others - military and civilians - about 
civil-military relations and work in defense policy formulation.  The other 
action is to hold a second seminar in Mozambique, probably outside of 
Maputo, possibly in Beira.  This time there will be more civilians, 
including politicians and journalists.  The themes will again be adjusted to 




 The single most important element making for the success of the 
program is the active and enthusiastic support of the Government of 
Mozambique represented by Minister of Defense Mazula.  The CCMR 
program fits into the overall strategy of the government to consolidate 
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peace and the multi-party democracy in which a crucial element is civil-
military relations.  The Minister and the team leader spoke by phone prior 
to the Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT) to define the 
priorities and topics to be covered in Monterey.  During the DVOT the 
topics for the future program in Maputo were defined and agreed upon.  
The Minister gave sufficient importance to the program in Maputo to 
ensure very high level representation by officers and civilians.  He, and 
the American ambassador, both opened and closed the program, and the 
Minister was present and very actively participating during at least part of 
three days.  In sum, he clearly demonstrated his interest and enthusiasm 
for the program, and by example and words encouraged others.  With 
regard to the team of instructors, the main lesson learned, and relearned, 
is to build the most highly qualified team possible who can respond 
accurately to questions on almost any defense or political topic from 
almost any angle.  And, they should include both civilians and active duty 
or retired military for initial credibility with the participants.  Then, the 
tailored program must attempt to convey general concepts or insights, but 
be richly illustrated with examples to bring the points home.  The 
dynamic of the program, in the debate, discussion, and simulation is also 
designed to involve the participants and keep them actively engaged in 
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issues that could be abstract or alien.  In this way the participants can 
expand their knowledge and develop insights to be more effective in 
dealing with their challenges in democratic civil-military relations.2 
 
                                                 
2 While most of this report is based on experience with the Mozambicans and in 
Mozambique, the following bibliography provides an excellent background to the 
current situation.  James Ciment, Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in 
Southern Africa (NY: Facts on File, 1997).  Margaret Hall and Tom Young, Confronting 
Leviathan:  Mozambique Since Independence (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997). 
  Joao Bernardo Honwana, The United Nations and Mozambique A Sustainable Peace? 
(Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, 1996).  Mark Simpson, 
“Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of Frelimo,” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 31, #2, 1993.  Richard Synge, Mozambique:  UN Peacekeeping in Action, 
1992-94 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997).  J. Michael Turner, Sue Nelson, 
and Kimberly Mahling-Clark.  “Mozambique’s Vote for Democratic Governance,” in 
Krishna Kumar, ed., Postconflict Elections, Democratization & International Assistance 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).  AlexVines, Angola and Mozambique:  The Aftermath of 
Conflict (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, May/June 
1995).  Eric Young, “The Development of the FADM in Mozambique: Internal and 
External Dynamics,” African Security Review 5, #12, 1996. 
